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HARMS RECOVERY IN THE
POOREST COUNTRIES
WIM NAUDÉ*
The global financial crisis, which erupted in Sep-
tember 2008, has had a particularly detrimental
impact on the poorest countries,of which the major-
ity is in Sub-Saharan Africa.As in other regions, the
crisis has led to a drop in African countries’ export
revenues, and raised the costs and difficulties of
accessing finance for firms, households and govern-
ments alike. But for African countries, unlike per-
haps many other regions that have also been
adversely affected, the shocks of the crisis may
imply more long-term difficulties. This is due to a
number of structural features shared by many coun-
tries of the continent, in particular (i) the high level
of poverty to start out with, and the resulting lower
household and government resilience to weather
the shocks as in other regions,(ii) the greater depen-
dency on aid than in other regions, (iii) the depen-
dence on commodity-driven export growth and
hence a high degree of vulnerability to declines in
external demand, (iv) the large number of fragile
states in the region,and (v) the relatively large num-
ber of small economies, many of which are land-
locked and do not yet share the benefits of strong
regional integration.1
The challenge facing the poorest countries, such as
those in Africa, is not only to ensure proper short-
term economic management of the crisis (and polit-
ical stability), but also to steer long-term recovery
in a way that will not undermine recent gains in
development, and moreover will contribute to-
wards a continent that is less vulnerable and more
resilient towards external shocks. This is a tall or-
der. Strengthening African governance, regional
integration and continuing to fast-track aid dis-
bursements and keeping to aid commitments will
all make a contribution, but ultimately, little long-
term progress will be made unless policymakers
here and in the West arrive at the correct views as
to the causes, impact and consequences of this cri-
sis.Unfortunately,one year into the crisis,many fal-
lacies abound.The problem is that if the world acts
according to these fallacies, it will harm the recov-
ery in Africa.
There are at least ten fallacies or misunderstandings
about the global financial crisis. I will describe these
briefly, note why I think they are wrong and point to
their implications for the developing world,especial-
ly for the poorest countries such as many of those in
Africa.
Fallacy 1: the crisis is solely a subprime mortgage
crisis
The first fallacy is that the crisis is solely due to the
problems in the US subprime mortgage market.The
danger of holding this view is that one might be con-
vinced that once the US financial system is cleaned
up (i.e. rid of the ‘toxic assets’) growth will resume
and it can be business as usual. And in the mean-
time, developing countries should only be con-
cerned with preventing contagion from spreading to
their banking systems. If, however, one realizes that
the crisis has deeper causes,and act to address these,
the benefits to developing country recovery and
growth will be much more. Specifically, recognizing
weaknesses in the world financial architecture and
governance and in the structural dominance of the
financial sector (the so-called Wall Street oligarchy)
may lead to more relevant and appropriate steps
being taken to prevent a re-occurrence of a bubble
economy.
While the causes of the crisis seem complex, at it
root may lie a simple reality: global imbalances in
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The causes are intertwined: per se global imbalances
would not have led to crisis, and without imbalances
the size and scope of the damage done by inade-
quate regulation may not have been as large.
Global imbalances
Global imbalances refer to what has also been
termed the global savings glut (Bernanke 2005).
These intensified after the 1997–98 Asian crisis
when these countries found the assistance of the
IMF to be unsatisfactory (for various reasons) and
started to accumulate foreign exchange reserves as
self-insurance. But many other developing coun-
tries, and developed countries such as Japan, also
started to accumulate foreign reserves. Most of the
world’s foreign reserves are in fact now held by mid-
dle-income developing countries. Currently, devel-
oping countries hold approximately 6 trillion US
dollars in foreign exchange reserves. China is the
largest single holder of US dollars, having around
2 trillion in reserves. The costs of these reserves to
China and other developing countries are substan-
tial.In effect developing countries’ saving is funding
high consumption in developed Western countries,
such as the United States, which by 2007 accounted
for more than 18 percent of global consumption
demand.
During the 2000–2007 period, the fact that the
United States was the issuer of the global reserve
currency, made it possible for the US Federal
Reserve to lower interest rates – by up to 27 times
between 2001 and 2003 – after the dot-com crisis
(Lin 2008). In effect, as it is now clear in hindsight,
the Federal Reserve responded to the bursting of
the dot-com bubble by inflating another bubble –
this time in house prices.This further fuelled house-
hold consumption in the United States, which rose
to exceed 70 percent of GDP, the highest level ever
in this country. As a result, global imbalances con-
tinue to widen.
But global imbalances cannot alone bear the blame
for the crisis – and neither should they be used to
point the fingers for the cause of the crisis at devel-
oping countries. After all, the United States was
under no obligation to expand household consump-
tion and inflate house prices in the manner that hap-
pened. The reason why it did, and why the rise in
house prices fed the growth of the subprime mort-
gage sector, is to be found in what could be
described as regulatory capture in the United States
(Johnson 2009a).
Regulatory capture refers to the dominance of the
financial sector in the US economy and to the ex-
tent that it was able to influence the weakening of
underwriting standards, regulation, supervision –
all of which resulted in moral hazards, inappropri-
ate and skewed incentives, and excessive risk tak-
ing.2 Regulatory capture contributed to (a) regula-
tory failure,(b) the rise of ‘shadow banking’ that is
of financial intermediation outside the regulated
and supervised banking sector, and (c) incentive
failure (Krugman 2007; Bicksler 2008). These
three pathologies led to problems during the
1997–98 Asian crisis, the dot-com crisis, as well as
in the current crisis and the way it is now being
handled. For instance the dot-com crisis was large-
ly caused by relaxed underwriting standards (new
high-tech firms could list on the stock exchange
with very little prospects or reputation) and fraud-
ulent ‘laddering’ and ‘spinning’ practices by in-
vestment banks (Taibbi 2009). Similarly, between
2000 and 2007 regulatory failure include relaxed
underwriting standards with respect to the issuing
of mortgage loans (with the so-called ninja-loans,
applicants were neither required to have proof of
income, employment or assets), the shift by banks
of poor quality assets off balance sheet,the issuing
of inappropriate AAA ratings on securitized
mortgage debt by credit rating agencies (CRAs)
who were paid for by the very investment banks
issuing the debt (see SEC 2008; Ely 2009), and the
backing of credit default swaps (CDSs), which
were issued as insurance against mortgage securi-
ties, by more CDSs.
Fallacy 2: the crisis is a single one-off event 
Many previous financial crises had much narrower
causes and erupted in a single discernable shock –
albeit affecting many indicators – but essentially dis-
sipating over time,allowing growth to resume.Many
previous crises in Africa were of this nature. It is a
fallacy to think that the current financial crisis is
similar.
The current global economic crisis is different in
that it is characterized by waves of successive ex-
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ternal shocks to developing countries over the
short space of three years. It started with house
price and stock market declines in 2007, spikes in
food and energy prices in mid-2008 further collaps-
es in stock markets and contractions in credit mar-
kets in late 2008, and a slump in world demand in
2009. Now, at the time of writing, food and energy
prices are edging upwards again, many stock mar-
kets are experiencing bull runs, and warnings are
emerging that bubbles may reappear in asset prices
(Ely 2009; Schiller 2009). Indeed, at the time of
writing (in October 2009) the gold price reached
record heights.
Each of the waves mentioned have impacted nega-
tively on African countries over the past three
years.An often bemoaned fact is that when the cri-
sis started to unfold in March–June 2007, many
African countries were enjoying a decade or so of
good growth. Table 1 shows the average GDP per
capita growth rates of the various developing
regions since 1961, as well as forecasts for growth
in 2009 and 2010. It can be seen from Table 1 that
all developing country regions achieved higher
average growth in the period since 2000, as com-
pared to the previous decade. Sub-Saharan Africa,
in particular,was on the path to recovery following
the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s and the adjustments
of the 1990s. Similarly, the countries of Eastern
Europe and Central Asia were gaining during the
last eight years after the painful transition period
of the 1990s.
One of the first casualties of the crisis was growth in
developing countries, which slowed down across all
regions. Lower growth leading to higher unemploy-
ment and higher poverty is widely seen to have more
serious longer-term impacts on developing country
prospects than similar growth disruptions in richer
countries.
Fallacy 3: the crisis has been caused by too rapid
financial innovation
Another fallacy is the belief that the crisis has been
caused by too rapid financial innovation. Believing
this could be an argument for that one may start to
caution against the stronger regulation of banks and
other financial institutions for the sake of not stifling
‘innovation’. In this view, the innovations of the past
decade in financial markets were ‘good’ in spreading
risk and should not be discouraged, and that it is
good enough merely to ‘plug’ the regulatory and
oversight gaps which this crisis has exposed.
However, with the more accurate expectation that
innovation should make a positive contribution and
realizing that innovation in finance of the past de-
cade has in fact not spread risk but covered risk up
as well as full of moral hazard and conflict of inter-
est problems, the call for real financial innovation
must be made, which would include ways to extend
banking to hundreds of millions of people across
Africa who daily suffer from a credit crunch.
The common frauds in financial markets known as
pyramid schemes (or Ponzi schemes) often (pur-
posely) appears very complex, but cannot in any
way be seen as innovations.Indeed,many of the so-
called innovations in financial markets only creat-
ed the pretence of spreading risk but in fact did
nothing of the sort. As put by Paul Krugman
(2007), the innovations of recent years – the alpha-
bet soup of CDOs and SIVs, RMBS and ABCP –
were sold on false pretences. They were promoted
as ways to spread risk, making investment safer.
What they did instead – aside from making their
creators a lot of money, which they did not have to
repay when it all went bust – was to spread confu-
sion, luring investors into taking on more risk than
they realized. Far from being innovative, the com-
Table e 1 1 
GDP P per r capita a growth h rates s for r developing g country y regions s 1960–2007 7 and d World d Bank k forecasts s  
for r output t growth h in n 2009–2010 0 (%) ) 
1961–69 1970–79 1980–89 1990–99 2000–07 2009  (f) 2010  (f)
East Asia & Pacific  1.58  3.98  5.43  6.43  7.08  5.5  6.6 
Latin America & Caribbean  2.79  2.85  – 0.68  1.40  1.93  – 2.2  2.0 
Middle East & North Africa  4.39  3.00  – 0.20  1.61  2.22  3.1  3.8 
South  Asia 1.80 0.23 2.88 2.97 4.77  4.6 7.0 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  1.99  0.72 –  0.86 –  0.53  2.13  1.0  3.7 
Europe & Central Asia na  na  na  – 1.59  5.12  – 4.7  1.6 
Source: Author’s compilation from World Bank World Development Indicators, Online and (f) World Bank Global Economic
Prospects, 22 June 2009.plex securitization of bad mortgages was quite ill-
suited for performing the basic functions of a good
financial system, namely to spread and minimize
risk and channel financial resources effectively.
Instead they may have covered risk up or even cre-
ated risk (Stiglitz 2009a).
So-called ‘financial innovations’ may also have
contributed to the bubble in oil prices in 2008.
Khan (2009) argues that it was the rapid ‘financial-
ization’ of oil markets that allowed the speculation
that led to inflated oil prices in 2008, when the
price of oil jumped from 90 USD per barrel in
January 2008 to 147 USD per barrel in July 2008,
dropping after the bubble burst to below 40 USD
per barrel by December 2008. The volume of oil
futures (‘paper barrels’) is more than 15 times the
daily production of oil (Khan 2009).With a growing
demand for bio-fuels this put great upward pres-
sure also on food prices, with both the fuel and
food price crisis causing untold suffering in devel-
oping countries during 2007 and 2008. In view of
this, many now would agree with Morris (2008),
who argued that it is impossible to exaggerate the
sheer idiocy of the financial machinery of the first
decade of this century.
Africa’s development requires financial deepening,
that is,a financial sector that can effectively interme-
diate between savers and borrowers.The global eco-
nomic crisis has made it clear that proper financial
innovation requires proper regulation,oversight and
governance of banks holding appropriate capital
buffers against unforeseen shocks.
Fallacy 4: the crisis was unforeseen
There is a widespread view that the current crisis was
unforeseen. This view was widely reported when
Queen Elisabeth II asked, at a London School of
Economics Seminar in November 2008, why no one
apparently forecasted or warned about the impending
crash (Bezemer 2009). Giles (2008) maintained that
the credit crisis, which has morphed into recession
across advanced economies, leaves most economic
forecasters with ample egg on their face.This has led
many in the economics profession to engage in hand-
wringing self-criticism, and for some to apologize on
behalf of the entire profession (Posner 2009).
The danger of subscribing to this fallacy is that it
makes it acceptable not only to ignore current pol-
icy advice from economists (and also to ignore
lessons learnt from previous crises), but also to
ignore the policy advice (mostly uncomfortable)
which comes by implication from those who did
indeed expect a crisis to take place.
There were indeed important failings in institutions
central to the global financial architecture in warn-
ing about the crisis and in working towards prevent-
ing it, in particular in the IMF and the US Federal
Reserve. On a number of occasions the IMF had
apparently misread the developing situation (as
opposed to many others,as I will show).For example
in 2006 the IMF is quoted to have indicated that
“there is little evidence to suggest that the expected
or likely market corrections in the period ahead
would lead to crises of systemic proportions”
(Bezemer 2009, 5). Also in its October 2007 World
Economic Outlook, the IMF, although concerned
about the subprime crisis in the United States and its
potential negative impact on slowing down growth,
still assumed in its baseline forecasts that, “market
liquidity is gradually restored in the coming months
and that the inter-bank market reverts to more nor-
mal conditions” (IMF 2007, xv). And, according to
the Federal Reserve’s Chairman Alan Greenspan in
February 2005, there was no danger of the US econ-
omy running into ‘anything resembling a collapsing
bubble’ and he expressed a ‘shocked disbelief’ when
it did happen in September 2008 (Bezember 2009).
But this does not mean the crisis was unforeseen.
Bezemer (2009) compiled a table discussing the
views of a dozen analysts who did foresee a serious
crisis or crash – see Table 2.
Fallacy 5: the crisis spells the end of globalization
Globalisation is the integration of the world econo-
my due to technological advances and policy initia-
tives, such as financial and trade liberalisation. For
many, the global economic crisis, being a crisis of
‘capitalism’,will set back the process of globalization
(e.g. Truman 2009). This end of globalization or the
‘undoing of globalization’ hypothesis has many
adherents. It is partly premised on the notion that
globalization has either caused or made possible the
current crisis. Lin (2009) argues that the crisis was
made possible because the volume and patterns of
international financial flows have increased consid-
erably in recent times.
The danger of subscribing to this fallacy is that this
may become a self-fulfilling prophecy, as countries
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may adopt more inward-oriented policies,eschewing
international trade. It also has the danger that
African countries may miss the opportunity to agi-
tate to make globalization better.The crisis may also
offer an opportunity to change the nature, not the
direction of globalization, so that developing coun-
tries can benefit more.
Globalization is not the cause or contributor to the
current crisis.Although the subprime crisis did have
global repercussions, it is rather surprising that
despite the extent of globalisation and the intercon-
nectivity between regions that the impact largely
remained centred on the United States – where
more than 70 financial institutions went bankrupt
since September 2008 to date and the country’s
investment banking industry was all but wiped out.
This is in stark contrast to much fewer banking fail-
ures elsewhere, despite ‘contamination’ of so-called
‘toxic assets’ containing securitised bad loans.
Indeed, the contrast could not be greater between
the collapse of banks in the United States and the
much lesser affected performance of banks in its
close neighbour,Canada (Richburg 2008;Kay 2008).
Far from heralding the end or slowing down of the
process of globalization, the global economic crisis
seems to be changing the course, the direction, of
globalization.
To be sure, global trade did contract substantially in
2009 (it is forecasted by the IMF to contract by
11 percent). But global trade is already – albeit
slowly – bouncing back. In previous crises, interrup-
tions in the growth of global trade were also tempo-
rary. We have seen this in the 1997 Asian crisis
(when the trade of affected countries recovered
within one year) and we are seeing it now, for
instance in the tentative recovery of China’s exports
(Zeiner 2009).
Perhaps with (or without) this recovery of global
trade we may be seeing a more meaningful pattern
of globalization emerging – one that breaks with the
centre-periphery pattern that has troubled develop-
ment economists since the days of Prebisch and
Singer. Consider for instance that during the past
year we have seen that (1) China has now overtaken
the United States as Africa’s largest trading partner,
(2) Chinese investment in Africa exceeded 100 bil-
lion US dollars in 2007, and (3) Chinese investment
and aid to Africa continues apace, despite the crisis.
Similarly, trade between Africa and India increased
ten-fold from 7 billion in 1997 to over 70 billion US
dollars in 2007, and trade between Latin America
and Africa more than doubled since 1994 and now
exceeds 26 billion US dollars (UN 2009).Within such
a rapid growth of South-South trade, the roles of
Brazil, China and India in particular stand out. The
size of these three economies combined exceeds that
of the United States. Unlike the United States, these
economies are growing robustly with predictions of
growing household demand, as their middle classes
grow more prosperous. They will increasingly
become less dependent on exports to the West.
Table e 2 2 
Foreseeing g the e global l economic c crisis s 
Analyst /Economist Forecast
Dean Baker (2006) “Plunging housing investment will likely push the economy into recession”.
Wynne Godley (2006) “The small slowdown in the rate at which US household levels are rising resulting from
the house price decline, will immediately lead to a [...] sustained growth recession [...]
before 2010”.
Fred Harrison (2005) “The next property market tipping point is due at end of 2007 or early 2008 [...]”.
Michael Hudson (2006) “Debt deflation will shrink the real economy, drive down real wages, and push our debt-
ridden economy into Japanese-style stagnation or worse”.
Eric Janszen (2006) “The United States will enter recession within years”.
Stephen Keen (2006) “Long before we manage to reverse the current rise in debt, the economy will be in a
recession”.
Jakob Brøchner Madsen (2005) “We are seeing large bubbles, and if they burst, there is no backup. The outlook is very
bad”.
Kurt Richebächer (2006) “A recession and bear market in asset prices are inevitable for the US economy [...]”.
Nouriel Roubini (2005) “Real home prices are likely to fall at least 30 percent over the next 3 years”.
Peter Schiff (2006) “The US economy is like the Titanic [...]. I see a real financial crisis coming for the
United States”.
Robert  Schiller  (2006) “There is significant risk of a very bad period, with rising default and foreclosures,
serious trouble in financial markets, and a possible recession sooner than most of us
expect”.
Source: Adapted from Bezemer (2009).Despite the crisis, there is continued investment in
Africa to further promote the continent’s integration
into the world markets. For example, more than
60 percent of the African Development Bank’s
(AfDB) current loan portfolio is addressed to glob-
alization-enhancing infrastructure like ports, rail-
ways, roads, etc.Also in the area of IT infrastructure
the continent has invested and coordinated on a fair-
ly extensive scale to extend its broadband connec-
tions by the provision of a number of underseas fiber
optic cables.
Fallacy 6: developing countries will be less affected
than the advanced economies
A sixth fallacy is that developing countries will be
less affected than the West. Hopes that developing
countries might avoid the worst of the financial and
economic crisis in the West due to decoupling of
growth rates have turned out to be overly optimistic.
Developing country growth rates and expected
future growth rates came tumbling down with amaz-
ing speed after the crisis erupted in September 2008.
Indeed, in some countries the actual decline of
growth rates in the first quarter of 2009 was much
worse than was expected, and the IMF and the
World Bank continued to revise their predictions for
developing country growth downwards.For instance,
in the case of Africa, the poorest continent, the IMF
revised its growth forecasts for 2009 downwards
from 5 percent in October 2008, to 3.5 percent in
January 2009 to 1.7 percent in April 2009, and more
recently the World Bank revised its forecast down to
a mere 1 percent (see Table 1).
It is not just the decline of GDP growth in the West
which will have a negative impact on African coun-
tries,but also the greater volatility of growth brought
about by the crisis and the uncertainty it brings.
Volatility in growth is bad for economic progress and
consumption in developing countries. Hnatkovska
and Loazya (2005) calculated,for example,that if the
UK GDP volatility was the same as that of Indo-
nesia, its annual per capita GDP growth would be
1.28 percent lower.
There are various channels and feedback effects
through which the global economic crisis (both
financially and economically) will impact on devel-
oping countries.Naudé (2009a and 2009b) as well as
Fosu and Naudé (2009) point out that developing
countries will not only be affected by the crisis, but
they will be affected to an even worse extent than
the West when one considers the impacts on pover-
ty. The reason for this is that households are much
more vulnerable and less resilient in most develop-
ing countries.They do not have the luxury of social
safety nets to buffer them during economic down-
swings.Consequently,a decline in growth will affect
developing country households worse than a simi-
lar decline would affect households in the West.
Many households will cut back on health expendi-
ture; many children will drop out of school. Even if
growth can be re-started again relatively soon, the
effects of a growth acceleration and growth col-
lapse are asymmetric. In Africa, “while growth
accelerations result in relatively small improve-
ments in human development, decelerations have
important negative impacts on education and
health outcomes.Under 5 mortality and infant mor-
tality for example, are substantially higher during
growth decelerations than in normal times,but they
do not improve during growth accelerations”
(Arbache and Page 2008, 9).
As a result, the global economic crisis will leave per-
manent scars on Africa’s development.The problem
therefore in adhering to this fallacy is that we might
be overtly focused on the short-term challenges of
getting growth and trade recovering,and omit giving
sufficient attention to the fact that developing coun-
tries may be worse affected (and even for longer
periods), due to permanent effects and adverse cop-
ing, which may not be the case in rich countries.
Fallacy 7: developing countries should wait for the
West to lead action towards recovery
A seventh fallacy is that developing countries can
wait for the West to lead in taking action or to assist
them in recovery.It would be a mistake to think that
the recovery steps of Western economies, or for
Western countries to stick to their aid commitments,
will substantially alleviate the impact of the crisis on
developing countries.The West is facing an unprece-
dented economic crisis of its own. Money thrown at
bailing out banks and struggling firms, and as a
result of fiscal stimulus initiatives, will require
spending cuts in the future as these countries man-
age their high debt and try to steer away from new
debt crises.
This is already clear by the fact that that the rich
countries have actually so far done very little for de-
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veloping countries during this crisis. Commitments
of monetary assistance seem inadequate and doubt-
ful. Aid budgets are being cut and aid is declining
despite commitments otherwise. And despite the
pledges made by the G-20, murky forms of trade
protection continue to be implemented. Despite
promises made, very few concrete steps have been
taken to start the reform of the IMF and the World
Bank.There is therefore a considerable responsibili-
ty on developing country governments themselves to
forge ahead with appropriate recovery measures and
initiatives (Naudé 2009b).
The way forward for most developing countries
beside China, India and perhaps Brazil (countries
with large domestic markets) may hinge on whether
or not exports can continue to be relied on to fuel
growth. Some believe that this is no longer possible.
These countries should now, with sluggish prospects
for Western growth and rising protectionism, stop
relying on exports. Calls for countries to stimulate
import replacement production and to reduce for
instance production of commodities for exporting
are being widely heard.
But others are less pessimistic about the potential of
exporting to continue to be a viable development
strategy. Here one can reiterate the benefits to be
gained from concluding the Doha Round (Adler et
al. 2009). There are also benefits to be gained from
greater South-South trade, and for progress in
regional integration and coordination. Here an
enhanced role of the UN in collaboration with
regional development agencies and regional integra-
tion initiatives is likely to have an important impact.
Even if developing countries are on their own in this
crisis, the mechanisms and tools which UN and
regional level assistance can provide will be indis-
pensable for the effectiveness of individual level
responses.
Fallacy 8: developing countries have plenty of scope
for fiscal stimuli
The eighth fallacy or misunderstanding about the
global economic crisis is that developing countries
have plenty of policy space to increase fiscal spend-
ing. The IMF called for a global stimulus equalling
2 percent of global GDP (Freedman et al.2009).But
only a few developing countries will be able to enact
substantial expansionary fiscal measures – these
include perhaps China, India, Indonesia and South
Africa, to name a few. Even here the problem is that
fiscal stimuli are only feasible for a short period. So
many short-term measures now being implemented
in some developing countries may soon run out of
steam or become counter-productive. Indeed, the
drop in commodity prices and the declines in trade
will rob many governments of significant resources,
thereby reducing the extent to which they can sup-
port fiscal expansion without accumulating unsus-
tainable debt. Fears of a new debt crisis have been
voiced.
Where developing countries can engage in short-
term fiscal expansion and avoid some of the pitfalls
identified above, these expansionary measures
should be limited in that (i) fiscal deficits should
exceed public investment, (ii) real interest rates set
by the monetary authorities should be such that it is
equal to the sustainable rate of per capita income
growth, and (iii) exchange rate depreciation should
be limited so as not to lead to unsustainable inflation
(Hailu and Weeks 2009).The danger is that the bet-
ter macro-economic balances in many African coun-
tries at the start of the crisis,and the example of huge
fiscal stimuli in rich countries,will create the impres-
sion that African countries should without hesitation
embark on fiscal stimuli of their own. Realizing that
this is not the case, however, leads to a sober ap-
proach of trying to balance the need for counter-
cyclical policy with the need to avoid a number of
pitfalls which may undermine growth later in the
future (Fosu and Naudé 2009).
Fallacy 9: the recovery measures taken by the West
will unambiguously benefit developing countries
A ninth fallacy is that the steps taken by the West to
recover will also benefit developing countries.
Assuming that the West’s recovery plans will work
and that it will benefit, and not harm, developing
countries appears to be rather risky.Indeed,the steps
taken by the West to boost the short-term recovery
may have adverse longer-term consequences for their
own growth and development.There are three broad
threats to the poorest countries.
The first is the threat of financial and trade protec-
tionism. Financial protectionism results from the
actions of the United States: as the issuer of the
world’s reserve currency it can pump trillions into its
banking sector to guarantee its stability, thereby
attracting funds from other countries without thisability. Trade protection is also evident in Section
1605 of the USD 787 billion stimulus package
approved in February 2009 which commits this coun-
try to a ‘buy American’ condition, i.e. to spend these
funds largely on goods manufactured domestically.
The implications of these clauses on US jobs, trade
commitments and foreign relations are discussed by
Hufbauer and Schott (2009),who conclude that they
are unlikely to create many jobs, will violate US
trade commitments and ultimate damage the coun-
try’s reputation with little to show for it.
The second is the possible fallout from the bank
bailouts, such as worse moral hazards, the socializa-
tion of risks, privatisation of profits, supporting the
‘wrong’ industries (‘rent-seeking’ finance and car-
bon-intensive manufacturing such as car making),
and setting a wrong example (rising protectionism
and bailouts across the world). A third is that with-
out fundamental reform of the global financial sys-
tem, countries will learn from this crisis that it pays
to self-insure through accumulating reserves, which
will depress global demand. Hence, the danger of
this fallacy is that it will lead to complacency and an
inappropriate short-term focus. We should not lose
sight of the longer-term implications of the crisis on
global development.
Fallacy 10: the crisis is over
Despite the recovery in output and trade in some
countries the crisis is not yet over. For one, it is not
clear-cut that the recovery will be durable.While opti-
mists see a straightforward V-shaped recovery, some
see it as being L-shaped (implying sluggish growth for
a long time) and others as a W-shaped recovery – a
‘double-dip recession’ (Roubini 2009).
There may be two reasons to take warnings of a dou-
ble-dip recession seriously.The first reason is simply
that the expansionary policies will run out of steam.
Lin (2009) is of the opinion that the improved
growth performance in recent months may be mere-
ly reflecting the ‘mechanic effect of the expansion-
ary’ policies adopted. The second is that the growth
will again be accompanied by the inflation of a bub-
ble which will burst again. One immediate danger is
that banks,having been recognized to be too large to
fail and having become even more concentrated
after the crisis,will re-engage in similar behavior (see
also below). Furthermore, some argue that the
lessons of the crisis had not been learned. Schiller
(2009),for instance,expressed the concern that spec-
ulative investment in housing is again starting in the
United States and that, as before, it is based on the
erroneous view that land shortages would keep pres-
sure on house prices to continue rising.
Many others also argue that the crisis could happen
again because the response (bailouts, new regula-
tions, fiscal stimuli) have been inadequate, and
should also include breaking up too-big-to-fail
banks and global restructuring (Johnson 2009c;
Stiglitz 2009a).But there have also been steps taken
and proposals put on the table to tighten the regula-
tions and oversight of the financial system – indeed
much of the G-20 response has been of this nature.
Ely (2009) presents a pertinent discussion of new
financial regulations in the light of the crisis. He
basically warns that if new regulations and new
oversight measures come to be the main structural
response to the crisis, then it may fall short, since it
is essentially reactive measures that will be taken,
and ingenious market participants may find a way
around these.“These new regulations will set up the
global economy for yet another financial crisis, per-
haps worse than the present one … indeed, policy-
making that responds to symptoms and conse-
quences of perceived problems, rather than forth-
rightly addressing the underlying causes of real
problems, will introduce greater fragility into the
financial system” (Ely 2009, 93).
Concluding remarks
Unless the fallacies discussed in this paper are dis-
carded, and coordinated actions taken to overcome
the root causes of the global economic crisis implied
to hide behind the fallacies, the danger of a slow
recovery for developing countries,in particular those
in Africa, remain a real threat.
Indeed those who adhere to these fallacies would
probably have thought it unlikely that US banks
would soon again engage in subprime securitized
mortgages. But it may be happening again. As re-
ported by Moore (2009) there is now, one year after
the subprime meltdown, a ‘gold rush underway’ by
banks to sell off ‘toxic’ subprime mortgage assets,
known as Re-Remics (re-securitization of real estate
mortgage investment conduits) (Apuzzo 2009).And
the too-big-to-fail banks – the Bank of America, J.P.
Morgan Chase and Wells Fargo – all saw strong
growth in 2009.It has been reported that their assets
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grew by respectively 138 percent, 51 percent and 43
percent between June 2007 and March 2009. They
are also now apparently finding it much easier to
borrow than smaller banks. For instance, at the time
of writing banks with assets in excess of 100 billion
US dollars were able to borrow at interest rates 0.34
percentage points lower than other banks, while
before the crisis the difference was only 0.08 per-
centage points (Cho 2009).
The problem of concentration in the banking indus-
try is compounded by the similar concentration in
related financial services which should provide
checks and balances.Thus ‘the analytical foundation
for much of the global financial system is now built
on the paid-for opinions of just seven firms – the big
three rating agencies and the big four accounting
firms’ (Ely 2009). Perhaps the penultimate word
should go to Johnson (2009b), quoting the chairman
of China’s sovereign wealth fund predicting that “it
will not be too bad this year. Both China and
America are addressing bubbles by creating more
bubbles and we’re just taking advantage of that. So
we can’t lose.”
Developing countries, and not the world’s big
banks, may be the ultimate losers of the crisis. The
stark reality of the crisis and its underlying cause in
global inequalities,inequities and bubble-cycles has
been laid bare in the contrast between two reports
published at the end of 2009. On the one hand, the
report that Goldman Sachs,which received USD 10
billion in bailout money, highlighted its largest ever
quarterly profit in 2009 and plans to pay out USD
11 billion in bonuses (Leonard 2009). And, on the
other,findings of a World Bank study reporting that
there will be 30,000 to 50,000 excess infant deaths in
Africa as a result of the crisis (Friedman and
Schady 2009).
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